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2Abstract
Accountability in community sector organisations is analysed in comparison with
the public and private for-profit sectors, according to a number of variables: who is
accountable (collective and individual); for what they are accountable (legal compliance
and financial reporting, general performance, treatment of individual clients); and to
whom they are accountable (the public, ‘owners’, and ‘clients’).  Accountability of
individual members within organisations is also explored. ‘Accountability’ to personal
values is misleadingly so named. The community sector has significantly less
accountability.
3Introduction
Academic research has identified a number of potentially problematic issues in
relation to the accountability of the community sector.  First, the sector places great
emphasis on the value-orientation and trustworthiness of its members, a feature which
discourages both external accountability (Taylor 1996: 59-60) and internal control
(McDonald 1999: 19).  Secondly, members of the sector face ‘multiple’ accountabilities
to a number of stakeholders rather than to a single source of authority (Leat 1990,
McDonald 1999: 12; Irvine 2000).  Thirdly, the emphasis on responding flexibly to the
needs of individuals militates against accountability in terms of general standards, such as
equity (Lipsky and Smith 1990), or through measurable performance indicators (Kearns
1994; Taylor 1996: 64).
However, though a number of problem areas have been clearly identified, they
tend to be discussed in isolation, without sufficiently explicit comparison with
accountability practices in the other main sectors, particularly in the public sector which
itself is subject to complex accountability requirements and has also been undergoing
significant evolution.  A more systematic comparison of accountability in all three sectors
may provide a clearer framework for better understanding accountability issues in the
community sector.  The context of the following discussion is Australia and the
Australian community sector, though much of the analysis has a wider, international
application.
Generalising across three sectors requires an inevitable degree of simplification.
For the purposes of analysis, the public sector will be represented mainly by the standard
government department under direct ministerial control, though sometimes the
4government as a whole is the focus of accountability. For the commercial private sector,
the typical case will be the larger public company incorporated under the Corporations
Law.  The community sector itself, however, is less easily stereotyped.  It will be taken to
include those private non-profit organisations that provide public welfare or community
services.  There is a wide range of organisations, varying greatly in historical origins,
size, legal status, internal organisation, dependence on government, relationship to
organised religion and so on.  At one end of the scale are the large, well-established
institutions such as the Red Cross or the St Vincent de Paul Society, which have multi-
million dollar budgets, professional staffs and several layers of institutionalised
management.  At the other end are smaller, more informal community-based associations,
such as neighborhood centres and community legal centres,  which rely more on
voluntary labour and small government grants.
The legal status of community sector organisations varies, including charitable
trusts, incorporated and unincorporated associations, companies limited by guarantee and
so on (Industry Commission 1995: 16-17;  Dal Pont 2000: ch 13). Regulation is at the
State level and varies considerably.  Some of these institutional variables are directly
relevant to issues of accountability and invalidate some attempts at generalising about
accountability across the whole sector.  No one type of organisation can therefore
adequately stand for the sector.  Instead, the sector needs to be represented by a range of
different types of organisation whose different features can be noted where relevant.
The core of accountability, briefly, is the obligation to answer to a superior for
one’s actions and to accept appropriate remedies including sanctions (Mulgan 2000a).
Such accountability has a number of features : it is other-oriented in that the account is
5given to some other person or body outside the person or body being held accountable; it
involves social interaction and dialogue, in that one side, that calling for the account,
seeks answers and remedies while the other side, that being held accountable, responds
and accepts rectification;  it implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an
account are asserting rights of authority or ownership over those who are accountable,
including the rights to demand answers and, where appropriate, to impose sanctions.
Accountability is also a situational concept, in that its requirements need to be determined
in terms of the particular context.  Of any accountability situation, we need to know: (i)
who is accountable, (ii) for what are they accountable and (iii) to whom are they
accountable.
Who is accountable?
(I) First, the question of who is accountable.  In all sectors, this can be answered
at both (a) the collective and (b) the individual level.  That is, the focus may be, firstly, on
the institution or organisation as a whole, ie the department, company or community
organisation, and on holding it accountable for actions taken in its name.  In such cases a
designated official usually answers on the institution’s behalf.  Alternatively, attention
may fall on the individual members of the organisation, ie public servants, company
employees or community organisation volunteers and employees, and on their personal
accountability for their actions within the organisation.  Reference to individual
accountability is particularly significant in the community sector where individual
members of charitable organisations have traditionally taken much of the burden of
responsibility on themselves.
6ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
PUBLIC PRIVATE FOR-
PROFIT
THIRD SECTOR
I Who is accountable:
(a) collective
(b) individual
Government, agency
Officials
Company
Employees
Organisation
Volunteers, employees,
II For what
accountable
Legal compliance and
financial reporting
Public interest
Just treatment of citizens
Legal compliance and
financial reporting
Profit
Fair treatment of
customers
Legal compliance and
financial reporting
Public welfare
Beneficial treatment of
clients
III To whom
accountable: (a) legal
compliance and
financial reporting
Public:
  Courts
Auditor-General
Public:
  Courts
  ASIC
  ACCC
Public:
  Courts
  Attorney-General
  Registrars
To whom accountable:
(b) general policy and
performance
Public:
  Parliament
  FOI
  Auditor-General
Owners/shareholders Members
Parent organisations
Donors [?]
To whom accountable:
(c) particular decisions
Citizen-clients:
  Complaints procedures
  and internal review
  FOI
  Ombudsman
  Tribunals/courts
  Anti-discrimination
  agencies
Customers:
  Complaints procedures
  and internal review
 Industry ombudsmen
  Courts
  Anti-discrimination
  agencies
Clients [?]
IV  Personal
accountability of
individuals
Hierarchical
Professional
Whistle-blowing
Hierarchical Hierarchical [?]
Professional/collegial
Whistle-blowing
7Accountable for what?
(II) The second question, for what are they accountable, relates to the activities or
tasks of which an account is required.  Here we may distinguish between three types of
activity for which organisations and individuals may be accountable.
(a) The first concerns legal compliance and financial reporting.  Organisations in
all three sectors, as well as their individual members, may be held to account for their
compliance with basic legal prohibitions against, for instance, fraudulent or criminal
behaviour in relation to the lives and property of others.  They are also required to
maintain certain standards in their financial dealings.  For instance, companies must deal
openly and honestly with the investing public while community organisations are
regulated in their fund-raising activities.  Directors of public companies are legally
accountable for exercising appropriate standards of supervision as are directors of
charitable companies limited by guarantee.
All organisations may also be expected to report accurately on their current
financial situation, though standards of financial reporting and auditing vary across the
sectors.  The most stringent reporting standards apply to public sector agencies on the
ground that they are handling public funds and should therefore be publicly accountable
for how these funds are expended.  Public companies in the private sector are required to
provide annual reports and annual accounts prepared in accordance with fixed standards
and approved by independent auditors.  The community sector, by contrast, is notoriously
unaccountable (Industry Commission 1995: ch 8; Dal Pont 2000: ch 15; Berman 2000).
Reporting standards for charitable trusts are particularly lax and variable, with no
obligation to lodge their accounts publicly.  Incorporated associations are required to
8make their accounts available but there is no universal requirement, as in the private
commercial sector, to abide by national accounting standards or even to secure an
independent audit (Sievers 1996: 138-41).
(b) The second area of activity for which organisations and their members may be
held accountable is the organisation’s general direction or performance.  In the public
sector, governments and public service departments are continuously being held to
account for their actions.  They are expected to act in ‘the public interest’, a catch-all,
umbrella term that embraces a number of potentially conflicting goals, including the
collective interests of the public as a whole as well as the interests of particular sections
of the public and individuals. Judgment of what the public interest requires in any given
situation is often complex and contestable, requiring an assessment of what is of value or
benefit for different groups and individuals as well as of how these various interests are
to be balanced against each other.  Recent reforms of public sector management and
budgeting have attempted to specify public sector objectives in more detail, in an effort to
match the clarity of private sector goals.  Elaborate constructions of strategic planning,
outputs, outcomes, milestones and performance indicators have certainly helped to make
government agencies more focused on achieving desired results.  But they have not been
able to obscure the essential ambiguity and contestability of many government objectives
(O’Faircheallaigh et al 1998: 194-8).  Holding government agencies to account thus
inevitably becomes a matter of political debate involving different and conflicting values.
The public interest provides a standard for assessing not only the results or effects
of government policy but also the processes by which these results are produced.
Government agencies and officials are held accountable for acting with due process in the
9public interest, for instance through behaving equitably, transparently and without
conflict of interest. This emphasis on process flows from an assumption that the
government belongs ultimately to the public and that its business should be carried out
transparently in accordance with clear values and standards.  A concern for process is
also reinforced by the difficulty of arriving at agreed standards for assessing results in the
public sector.  Although the public interest in terms of policy outcomes cannot be
unambiguously determined, decisions should at least be reached by generally acceptable
and fair procedures.
The private for-profit sector presents a less contested, though not entirely
straightforward, picture.  By definition, all commercial companies in this sector are
aiming to maximise their profit and shareholder value and this goal provides a readily
intelligible standard against which they can be held accountable.   Admittedly, the
concepts of both profit and shareholder value are not totally unambiguous, because they
require the specification of a time-frame which provides the potential for disagreement
between shorter-term and longer-term benefits.  On the whole, however, compared with
the deeply contested notion of the public interest, the goals of a commercial company are
relatively clear and measurable.
Given the comparative clarity of commercial objectives and the transparency of
the eventual bottom line, there is less need than in the public sector to hold commercial
companies to acceptable standards of due process.   Because the results are so clearly
assessed, the company can be given more freedom to determine how these results are
achieved.  The clearer the end, the less accountability for means.  Not that the sector is
entirely free of process accountability.  As already noted, companies are expected to meet
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certain financial requirements as well as to refrain from uncompetitive activities and to
show respect for life and property, including respect for the health and safety of
employees. But they remain, compared with the public sector, comparatively
unconstrained with respect to process.
What then of the community sector?  In some important respects, it is closer to the
public sector in that the overall objectives of its institutions are generally more
contestable than those of the commercial sector.  There is, indeed, no readily acceptable
catch-all term for its goals to match ‘the public interest’ or ‘profit’ for the other sectors –
another illustration of the sector’s loose and amorphous nature.  The term ‘public
welfare’ may stand for the general intention to do good for members of the community in
areas typically associated with the provision of welfare services. Like ‘the public
interest’, ‘the public welfare’, or whatever more specific goals individual community
sector organisations adopt, is a value-laden term which is contestable in application and
does not have the degree of objective clarity associated with profit or shareholder value.
For this reason, community sector organisations have the same difficulty as public sector
agencies in reducing their objectives to clearly specifiable and measurable outputs and
outcomes (McDonald 1999: 18).
 Not having a clearly measurable bottom line, the activities of community sector
organisations are thus much less easily monitored than those of the private commercial
sector.  At the same time, the community sector does not submit itself to the degree of
external scrutiny and political debate that allows the public sector to be held accountable
for its value-laden activities (see further below).   Organisations that contract with
government to provide publicly funded public service must accept a high level of
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accountability for achieving agreed outputs, similar to that expected of the public sector.
But for the most part they escape public scrutiny.  This reduced level of accountability
helps to explain a significant difference between how the community and public sectors
approach their shared objective of enhancing public welfare.  Individual members of the
community sector often interpret their public mandate in a more particularistic way, with
more attention given to dealing with particular individuals in need and less concern for
applying general standards of equitable treatment across the whole range of people with
similar needs.   Governments and public servants, on the other hand, know that they will
be called on to justify their preferential treatment of one case over another and so are
forced to adopt strict rules of equity, even at the possible risk of lowering average
standards of welfare (Lipsky and Smith 1990).
Community sector organisations are similar to the public sector in that
independent value is often placed on process, on how decisions are made.  Many
members and employees of charitable organisations have their own procedural agendas,
believing that the organisations’ values should apply as much to its internal management
as to its external activities, for instance in according all members equal respect and
consulting them about collective decisions.  Again, as with the public sector, such respect
for process not only reflects firmly held values about process but is also a result of the
contestability of values when applied to results.  In the absence of an unambiguous
bottom line, it may be easier to agree on a fair process than on a fair outcome. Though the
process values may be close to those of the public sector, the extent of accountability for
their observance is much less than in the public sector, being largely internal to
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organisations rather than to the public at large and even then not universally accepted
(McDonald 1999: 16-18).
(c) Thirdly, organisations are held accountable for their treatment of particular
individuals.  In the public sector this type of accountability applies most especially to
those departments and agencies that have direct dealings with the public, such as the
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Australian Taxation Office and
Centrelink.   Such agencies are held accountable not only for their general performance
but also for how they deal with individual members of the public.  Similarly, private
trading companies are accountable for their treatment of individual customers.
Community sector organisations, too, can be held accountable for how they behave
towards individuals who seek their help.  Again, the extent of such accountability differs
across the sectors, with the public sector offering the fullest range of accountability
procedures to individual clients and the community sector the least (see further below).
Accountable to whom?
(III) The third accountability question asks to whom organisations as a whole and
their individual members are accountable.  This question can be answered in terms of the
previous distinction between the three areas of accountability (legal and financial, general
and particular).
(a) In relation to legal compliance and financial reporting, the ultimate initiator
and recipient of accountability is the general public.  Members of the public have a
general interest in the protection of property and in the financial integrity and fair dealing
of institutions.  They also have a right to be informed about the financial situation of an
organisation, whether it is actually owned by them, as a public institution, or, though
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privately owned, seeks to deal with members of the public, investors or donors.  The
function of holding organisations financially transparent is legally delegated on behalf of
the public to particular agencies of public accountability.  Thus, the police and the courts
operate across all three sectors in particularly blatant cases of property abuse, such as
theft and embezzlement.  Also critically important are the various agencies responsible
for auditing and monitoring  performance.  Thus in the public sector, ministers and
agencies are accountable to the Auditor-General for matters of financial compliance and
probity, while in the private commercial sector, companies must lodge their accounts and
annual reports with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
which also, along with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),
plays an active role in monitoring company compliance with relevant laws and
regulations.
In the community sector, this role is played by a variety of officers or agencies,
depending on the legal status of the organisations.  Charitable trusts are accountable to
the Attorney-General while incorporated associations usually report to a Registrar and
companies limited by guarantee are regulated by the ASIC. However, this aspect of
community sector accountability is generally agreed to be highly deficient, in keeping
with, and no doubt contributing to, the generally lax standards of community sector
accounting.   No effective monitoring is undertaken either by Attorneys-General or
Registrars who normally act only in response to individual complaints (Dal Pont 2000,
436-7).   Calls for reform have been made from time to time, for instance, through the
suggested creation of a supervisory body, along the lines of the powerful United
Kingdom Charities Commission, or by including community organisations under the
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Corporations Law (the preferred option of the Industry Commission (Industry
Commission 1995: 214-20) but no progress has been made to date.
(b) The second area of accountability is for general direction and performance.
Here, as is to be expected, there is considerable variation across the sectors.
Accountability for direction and performance is generally owed to those who are seen as
the owners of the enterprise.  Thus, in the public sector, the public are unquestionably the
ultimate owners of their government and so the government and its agencies are
accountable to them through a variety of channels (Mulgan 1997).  Preeminent among
these channels is the chain of ministerial responsibility whereby public servants are
accountable through their departmental hierarchies to ministers who are themselves
accountable to Parliament and the electorate.  Supplementary avenues of accountability
are provided by parliamentary scrutiny of departments though committees, independent
performance evaluations undertaken by Auditors-General (at the Commonwealth and in
most States and Territories) as well as general reports provided by ombudsmen.
In this respect, government agencies are subject to multiple demands of
accountability (eg Finn 1993; Corbett 1996: ch 9).  Potential conflict between these
various demands is mitigated by a division of responsibility which give ministers the
right to determine and to be held accountable for matters of ‘policy’, leaving agencies to
be accountable through other channels only for matters of ‘administration’.  Though the
distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘administration’ is notoriously imprecise, in practice
ministers can declare any matter of concern to them to be a matter of policy and thus out
of bounds for independent official discretion.  By the same token, senior bureaucrats,
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acting in the name of the minister, may impose directions on subordinates and make the
minister accountable for their implementation.
In the private sector, general accountability is primarily to the owners, that is in
the case of large listed companies, the shareholders.   Shareholders elect the directors and
hold them to account through regular reports and annual general meetings.  Moreover,
shareholders also hold management accountable through the constant reporting of the
share price which provides a continuous indicator of management performance. Various
attempts are periodically made to widen the general accountability of companies by
arguing that they need to answer to other ‘stakeholders’, including consumers and the
general public.  But such concerns for the wider public typically fall short of the
obligations associated with accountability, such as the duty to release information or to
accept directions.
Individual customers or clients may have accountability rights in relation to
particular goods or services that they purchased from the company.  But they normally
have no rights to question the general policy or performance of the company.  For such
general matters, the company is accountable only to its owners or shareholders for whom
it must return a profit (Sternberg 1998).  Individual members of the public can choose to
take their custom elsewhere (the main engine of market competition) but they have no
right to complain directly to the company.  In the language of public choice theory, they
have rights of ‘exit’ but not ‘voice’.  Similarly, unless social obligations are incorporated
into law and companies made legally accountable for observing them, most companies
see no reason to recognise such obligations, except purely instrumentally, as means of
furthering their commercial advantage.
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In the community sector, who performs the role equivalent to that of citizens
(public sector) or shareholders (private commercial sector), as the ultimate owners to
whom organisations are accountable for general policy and performance?  The answer
depends on the legal structure of the organisation. Some are established by churches that
operate under their own statute in which case the charitable organisations are accountable
to the parent church. In the case of trusts, the trustees are appointed either by the original
founders or by other trustees and are free to make their own decisions subject to
constraints set by the purposes of the trust and general fiduciary requirements laid up on
all trustees, such as avoiding conflicts of interest. Though trustees can be said to be
legally accountable to the Attorney-General for compliance with the terms of the trust, in
practice this accountability is rarely invoked and is usually ignored by trustees. For the
most part, trustees are accountable only to each other.
With the exception of the church-based charities, most major charities operate as
incorporated associations under State Associations Incorporation Acts (Dal Pont 2000:
374-5). Incorporated associations must have a constitution and are usually managed by a
committee elected by a wider group of members at an annual meeting.  Members may
sometimes be active in the organisation, for instance as volunteers.  Formally, however,
they have a position essentially similar to that of shareholders, though their legal rights
depend on the rules of the association and may be less extensive than those of
shareholders (Sievers 1996: 111-26).  The lack of a constantly reported share price
deprives them of any equivalent to the shareholder’s indicator of company performance.
Overall, then, community sector organisations are comparatively unaccountable for their
overall performance and direction.  They answer in a generally perfunctory manner to a
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comparatively restricted groups of owners.   Community sector organisations undertaking
contracts for publicly funded services find themselves accountable to a range of public
sector paymasters.   However, such accountability to government is for limited and
specified tasks and does not extend to accountability for general performance.
It is sometimes argued that charitable organisations should be accountable to
donors who contribute financially without being either trustees or members (eg Industry
Commission 1995: ch 8). Indeed, some jurisdictions are requiring a degree of
accountability to donors (Industry Commission 1995: 206), though the principle is by no
means firmly established.  The position of a donor could be seen as similar to that of a
taxpayer in the public sector who contributes his or her funds to the government and
therefore has a right to a say in what it does and how it performs. However, the
accountability required seems to fall short of that associated with the ownership of
citizens or shareholders.  It is more a right to information, so that donors may know what
they are getting with their gift, rather a right to influence direction.  In this case the
accountability being sought is similar to the information demanded of private companies
by Corporations Law as part of fair trading for members of the public who are potential
clients or investors.  It is not so much accountability to donors as a duty of transparency
to the general public.
(c) The third area of accountability is for the treatment of individual members of
the public in the their dealings with organisations.  Here the general principle is that the
organisation should be accountable to the individual client or customer, particularly when
service is unsatisfactory.  This principle is recognised in all three sectors, but with
varying mechanisms.  As is to be expected, the most extensive mechanisms are in the
18
public sector.  All government agencies that deal directly with the public are required to
have formal service charters setting out the rights of citizen-clients. Disgruntled citizens
may apply to well-established internal complaints and review mechanisms in all agencies.
Beyond that they may apply to the Ombudsman and, in certain types of case, to
administrative appeal tribunals empowered to review the merits of individual
administrative decisions.  They may also take up the case with their local member of
Parliament who can make representations via the Minister or refer them to the relevant
review processes.
In the private sector, dissatisfied customers can generally exercise their right of
exit by taking their custom elsewhere.  If their treatment on any particular occasion
requires an actual remedy, they can complain first to the company itself which will often
have a formal complaints procedure.  They also have access to a variety of legal
remedies, under the common law as well as consumer protection legislation.  A number
of industries, such as banking and insurance, have also followed the public sector in
establishing their own independent review officers, sometimes adopting the public sector
title of  ‘ombudsman’ (Mulgan 2000b).
By contrast, the community sector is less well developed in its accountability to
individual clients or customers for services rendered.   Though the rationale of
community sector organisations is to provide welfare for the public, the definition of
what that welfare requires and whether it has been delivered has traditionally been a
matter for the charitable organisation to define.  Admittedly, the patronising paternalism
characteristic of traditional charities has largely been rejected.  Many of the more recently
founded organisations have a strong commitment to egalitarian principles of equal
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participation and consultation, not only internally between members but also in relation
to the clients they are attempting to assist.  Many workers in the community sector no
doubt see themselves as ‘accountable’ to their clients. This respect for clients is usually
expressed in the form of a willingness to listen to their clients’ requests and be responsive
to their needs. In Leat’s beguiling phrase, it is a form of ‘voluntary ‘ accountability rather
than required accountability (Leat 1990:148).
However, one can question whether such responsiveness can genuinely count as
accountability (Mulgan 2000a).  Grace-and-favour consultation falls short of according
the rights normally associated with accountability to clients, for instance the right of the
disgruntled client to demand an explanation or to seek a remedy through a recognised
channel of  review.   Indeed, in many instances, beneficiaries of  charitable organisations
have no more rights than customers in the commercial private sector (Uphoff 1996).
Moreover, as already noted, the community sector nurtures values which are inimical to
the establishment of genuine accountability regimes.  The holistic and particularistic
respect for individual clients who present themselves for care is at risk if carers must
always have an eye on how they would justify their actions to an impartial authority.
Accountability encourages impersonal rules and inflexible procedures whereas
community service, particularly by volunteers, depends on personal and spontaneous
attention (Taylor 1996: 67).
Individual accountability
IV. Discussion so far has centered on the collective accountability of
organisations in the three sectors.  However, accountability issues can also face
individual members and employees within organisations.  In hierarchical organisations,
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such as the typical government department or private company, individual employees
generally work under the direction of managers or owners who set the policy for the
organisation and its staff.  They are thus personally accountable to their superiors within
the organisation for the performance of set tasks, including their appropriate contribution
to the organisation’s collective accountability to its owners and clients.   To this extent,
their personal accountability dovetails with  the collective accountability of their
organisation.
At the same time, individual members and employees may recognise an
obligation beyond the organisation and see themselves as personally accountable to the
general public, to particular clients or to their professional peers, regardless of, or in spite
of, the directions of their superiors.  The clearest cases of such personal accountability are
provided by ‘whistle-blowers’ who feel obliged to expose illegal or obviously improper
behaviour within their organisations and are thus exercising accountability directly to the
public. Another type is ‘professional’ accountability, the accountability that trained
professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, owe to both their professional peers and their
clients, which may sometimes cut across the obligations to institutional employers.
Such professional accountability, however, requires the possibility of being
actually called to account, for instance by a professional tribunal or informally by the
scrutiny of colleagues.  It is to be distinguished from professional responsibility which is
acting out of commitment to an internalised sense of professional values.  Some
influential analyses of accountability have included this type of personal responsibility as
a form of ‘internal’ accountability (Day and Klein 1987: 217-19; Sinclair 1995,  Corbett
1996: 201; cf Kearns 1994).  However, as it lacks the external scrutiny which is central to
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the rationale of accountability, such a description is misleading (Mulgan 2000a ).  It may
also be self-serving because it allows experts to mask the degree to which they are
actually unaccountable.
The personal accountability of individual members within an organisations thus
involves a number of dimensions: accountability to superiors, to colleagues and directly
to the public.  Each sector sets its own particular balance.  In the private commercial
sector, accountability to superiors is paramount.  Individuals may be allowed a
comparatively large degree of discretionary judgment but are held highly accountable in
terms of measurable results demanded by the management.  Whistle-blowers are likely to
face dismissal and attempts to discredit their evidence.  The public sector is more
complex. Public servants are expected to be accountable within their profession for the
maintenance of professional standards and values. Genuine whistle-blowing, in the sense
of revealing illegality or impropriety, is officially condoned as well as being legally
protected in some jurisdictions. However, public servants accept the right of elected
politicians to determine policy and would reject any claim to act as independent
‘guardians of the public interest’ (Keating 1999).    Accountability through the minister to
Parliament and the public generally takes priority over other channels.
 ‘Street-level’ bureaucrats, who deal directly with the public, sometimes see
themselves as primarily accountable to their clients rather than to their bureaucratic
superiors or political masters (Lipsky 1980, Yeatman 1994). The preference for ‘bottom-
up’ rather than ‘top-down’ accountability is particularly marked in the United States
where the separation of executive and legislative power has tended to blur the lines of
centralised control and where more emphasis has been given to empowering rank-and-
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file bureaucrats (eg Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  In Australia, too, individual public
servants can be held directly accountable to clients, for instance under complaints
procedures or service charters.  However, as already argued, a sense of professional
responsibility to clients is not to be confused with accountability.  For the most part, the
individual accountability of Australian public servants is subsumed in the collective
accountability of their departments and operationalised through the hierarchical chain of
command and control.
The community sector is marked by a comparative lack of individual
accountability.  Though community organisations vary greatly in their management
structures, internal hierarchy generally tends to be weak and individual employees and
volunteers are not as internally accountable as those in other sectors. A number of factors
contribute to this organisational fluidity.   Directors and management committees can be
inexperienced amateurs with little time or expertise to devote to supervising the
organisations nominally under their control (Taylor 1996: 61; Gibelman et al: 1997).
Legal requirements on boards and committees are minimal while accounting and
management standards are lax in comparison with the other sectors.   Most important, in
spite of being formally elected by the membership, boards and committees are generally
not accorded any superior moral right to set the direction and policy for the organisation.
Compared with their public sector counterparts, community sector leaders lack the
equivalent of the external democratic mandate that underlies the right of ministers and
senior public servants to impose centralised administrative solutions on public sector
agencies and which gives them the right to challenge the individual public servant’s own
interpretation of what the public interest requires.  In this respect, the lack of collective
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accountability to the wider public encourages a corresponding lack of internal
accountability within the organisations.
Compounding and building on this weakness in leadership, individual charity
workers, whether volunteers or employed professionals, tend to rely very heavily on their
individual judgment of what actions should be taken and are reluctant to accept direction
from others, such as supervisors or managers. Volunteers are contributing their services
freely out of a conviction that they are doing good works which entails a presumption
that they can define for themselves what works are good.   Employed professionals have
their own expertise which gives them the confidence to reject the instructions of amateurs
in positions of formal authority.  Because such professionals often earn less than they
would in the public or private commercial sectors, they too enjoy a sense of vocational
commitment which strengthens confidence in their own judgment. The result is typically
a collection of strongly committed individuals each confident in his or her own personal
mission.  Collective cohesion depends on shared values and trust rather than centralised
control (McDonald 1999: 13, 17).   Members may see themselves as ‘accountable’ to
their own values (Taylor 1996: 68), but, again, this is to confuse a sense of responsibility
with genuine accountability.  Perhaps the most effective type of internal accountability
within community sector organisations is horizontal rather than vertical, that owed to
colleagues and fellow professionals rather to superiors.  Individual welfare workers will
often recognise the rights of fellow workers to question their actions, demand
explanations and perhaps even impose collective remedies and redirection, particularly
on matters of process if not of actual outcome.
Conclusion
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In summary, then, the community sector is lacking in accountability across a
whole range of areas, including legal compliance and financial reporting, overall
performance, and treatment of individual clients. Community sector organisations do not
answer to the wider public or to clients to same extent as the public sector nor, unlike the
commercial private sector, are they held accountable in terms of a definable objective.
Internal mechanisms of accountability are weak, with individual workers a law unto
themselves compared with workers in the other sectors. Thus, when community sector
organisations come into contact with the other sectors, for instance through providing
publicly-funded services or entering into contracts with private commercial companies,
conflicting accountability cultures naturally give rise to problems and misunderstandings.
The main feature of the sector’s accountability regime is not, as sometimes
suggested, its complexity but rather its deficiency.   Community sector accountability, as
commentators have noted, is to multiple stakeholders and for indeterminate objectives
and in these respects more complex than in the commercial private sector.  But these
complicating factors also occur in the public sector where public servants are accountable
for politically contestable objectives to a variety of stakeholding sections of the public
and through a variety of channels (Taylor 1996: 61).   The public service, too, is staffed,
if not by volunteers, then by committed professionals who have strong views about what
the public need and who also have difficulty in reducing their services to neatly
measurable outputs.
The major differences between the public and community sectors are two-fold.
One is the sheer extent of accountability.   Public servants must account for far more of
what they do than workers in the community sector.  The second is the degree of
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structure imposed on their various accountability requirements.  Public servants may be
accountable through a variety of channels but for the most part these channels
complement rather than conflict  with each other.  Review agencies such as parliamentary
committees, the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, and tribunals, and review procedures
directly to the public are all seen as supplementary to the overriding accountability to the
public through the minister.  All concentrate on exercising scrutiny in their own particular
areas while keeping clear of each other’s jurisdiction.  By contrast, the community sector
generally lacks a similarly coordinated structure of accountability because accountability
has not been seen as such a central value and because elected leaders have not been
accorded superior democratic legitimacy.
How far the accountability deficit should be reduced is an issue for further
reflection and beyond the scope of this article.  Certainly, pressure for increased
accountability can be expected.  All sectors are experiencing diminishing trust of elites
and greater demands for transparency as well as for sanctions when managers and
directors fall short of public expectations.  Moreover, as the community sector is drawn
further into the public domain of providing taxpayer-funded services, it will be required
increasingly to adopt higher, public-sector standards of accountability (McDonald 1999:
20).  On the other hand, accountability always comes with a cost, particularly the
emphasis it places on centralised coordination and control which may stifle flexibility and
spontaneity of response to public needs (Taylor 1996: 63; Onyx 2000: 67-8).  Provided
that the community sector can retain a higher level of commitment and trust among its
workers and comparatively greater public confidence in its integrity and value, then it can
continue to operate with a less elaborate structure of accountability.  This is not
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necessarily to question the need for such reforms as improved financial reporting and
greater rights for clients. Nor is it to deny that participating in publicly funded welfare
projects will bring additional accountability demands.  However, the sector need not ape
the accountability regimes of other sectors in every respect.  Part of its unique value may
depend on a comparative lack of accountability.
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